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 NOTE 
Speech as Speech: “Professional Speech” and 
Missouri’s Informed Consent for Abortion 
Statute 
Michael J. Essma* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Does life begin at conception?  Do women need to see a sonogram to 
make an informed decision about whether they want an abortion?  Some state 
legislatures believe so.1  Laws mandating politically driven doctor-patient dia-
logue affect one of the hallmarks of the physician-patient relationship: a pa-
tient’s trust in the physician’s expertise.  The common law and statutory re-
quirement that a patient provide informed consent for a medical procedure fa-
cilitates the development of trust between patient and physician by allowing 
the patient to understand the procedure and discuss her options with her physi-
cian.2  However, provisions of abortion-specific informed consent statutes that 
require physicians to communicate to the patient messages with which the phy-
sician disagrees undermine this trust.  As opined by one reproductive health 
physician, “[T]he doctor-patient relationship is based on trust – and how does 
a patient trust us if we’re giving them false information because we have to?”3 
Just as patients have an interest in a clear understanding of the procedure, 
physicians possess liberty and autonomy interests when discussing their pro-
fessional beliefs.4  In an ever-changing field like medicine, “interfer[ence] with 
physician-patient speech . . . affects the development of new ideas.”5  Addi-
tionally, power dynamics inherent in the doctor-patient relationship magnify 
 
* B.A., University of South Carolina-Columbia, 2016; J.D. Candidate, University of 
Missouri School of Law, 2020; Senior Lead Articles Editor, Missouri Law Review, 
2019–2020.  Thanks to Professor Christina Wells for her assistance throughout the writ-
ing process and to the editors of the Missouri Law Review for their comments and feed-
back during the writing and editing process. 
 1. See Callie Beusman, A State-by-State List of the Lies Abortion Doctors Are 
Forced to Tell Women, VICE (Aug. 18, 2016), https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/arti-
cle/nz88gx/a-state-by-state-list-of-the-lies-abortion-doctors-are-forced-to-tell-women. 
 2. Marc D. Ginsberg, Informed Consent: No Longer Just What the Doctor Or-
dered? The “Contributions” of Medical Associations and Courts to A More Patient 
Friendly Doctrine, 15 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 17, 18–20, 26 (2010). 
 3. Beusman, supra note 1. 
 4. Sarah Kramer, Not Your Mouthpiece: Abortion, Ideology, and Compelled 
Speech in Physician-Patient Relationships, 21 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 23–24 
(2018). 
 5. Id. at 11. 
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the importance of the doctor’s ability to speak freely because patients rely on 
the doctor’s medical judgment.6  Indeed, state-mandated messages present “the 
danger that patients will be coerced and confused by government messages 
delivered by physicians.”7  However, state legislatures still need the ability to 
regulate the conduct of professionals, such as physicians.  By extending the 
traditional doctrine of informed consent to its outermost limits, abortion-spe-
cific laws tread in the middle of several competing interests, such as a physi-
cian’s free speech rights, a patient’s right to accurate information, and the 
State’s power to regulate the medical profession. 
Courts have had difficulty with compelled speech challenges to informed 
consent statutes because of the intersection between speech and conduct.8  Re-
quirements that a physician provide a patient with controversial statements re-
garding the beginning of life represent a perplexing intersection between the 
freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment and the State’s interest 
in regulating the medical profession.  In fact, some have observed that “the 
regulation of professional speech is theoretically and practically inseparable 
from the regulation of medicine.”9  This inevitably complicates the determina-
tion of the level of scrutiny under which courts should review abortion in-
formed consent statutes. 
A balance needs to be struck between permitting state legislatures to reg-
ulate abortions like any other medical procedure and preventing legislatures 
from compelling physicians to make statements with which they fundamentally 
disagree.  This is a difficult conceptual problem, as shown by myriad incon-
sistencies in rulings amongst the federal circuit courts.10  Previously, the United 
States Supreme Court provided little guidance in reviewing potentially objec-
tionable informed consent disclosures in the abortion context.11  However, the 
Court’s recent decision in National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. 
Becerra,12 which involved a statute requiring pro-life pregnancy centers to pro-
vide patients with certain information, clarified how courts should determine 
 
 6. Id. at 12–13. 
 7. Paula Berg, Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient Discourse 
and the Right to Receive Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U. L. REV. 201, 206 (1994). 
 8. Harrison Blythe, Note, Physician-Patient Speech: An Analysis of the State of 
Patients’ First Amendment Rights to Receive Accurate Medical Advice, 65 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 795, 797–98 (2015). 
 9. Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of 
Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 951. 
 10. Compare Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 
737–38 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc), with Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 250 (4th Cir. 
2014). 
 11. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881–87 (1992). 
 12. See 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
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the level of scrutiny when reviewing informed consent disclosures.  This deci-
sion – initially viewed as a win for pro-life organizations in pro-choice states13 
– may ironically become a win for abortion providers in pro-life states because 
of the difficult task the courts face in balancing the competing interests of free 
speech and the regulation of the medical profession. 
Part II of this Note discusses the background of the Missouri informed 
consent statute and compares it with other states’ informed consent statutes.  
Part II further explores how the United States Supreme Court and several fed-
eral circuit courts have decided compelled speech challenges to other informed 
consent statutes.  Part III examines the Court’s holding in Becerra and analyzes 
how that holding clarified the holding in Planned Parenthood v. Casey and its 
view on “professional speech.”  Finally, Part IV examines the constitutionality 
of the compelled speech aspects of Missouri’s informed consent statute under 
existing precedent.  Part V then argues that the United States Supreme Court’s 
holding in Becerra suggests that the federal circuits have failed to apply the 
proper level of scrutiny to cases involving informed consent statutes. 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This Part discusses the legal history of Missouri’s informed consent stat-
ute and addresses several portions of Missouri’s statute that compel speech.  
Then, this Part discusses a phrase inserted in Missouri’s statutory preamble that 
faced constitutional challenges at the United States Supreme Court.  Next, this 
Part reviews Casey,14 a landmark case involving compelled speech in informed 
consent to abortion statutes, and its implications on informed consent statutes.  
Finally, this Part will consider the current circuit split on professional speech 
in the context of informed consent for abortion statutes in the wake of Casey. 
A. Informed Consent Laws Generally 
Since the Court recognized abortion as a fundamental liberty protected by 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Roe v. Wade,15 pro-
life lawmakers have used informed consent laws to limit the number of abor-
tions.16  Informed consent laws place an array of restrictions on access to abor-
tion, such as waiting periods, in-person counseling, viewing ultrasounds, and 
presenting written materials that inform the patient on the medical procedure.17  
 
 13. Emma Green, The Supreme Court Hands a Win to the Pro-Life Movement, 
ATLANTIC (June 26, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/the-
supreme-court-hands-a-win-to-the-pro-life-movement/563738/. 
 14. Casey, 505 U.S. 833. 
 15. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 16. Post, supra note 9, at 940. 
 17. See Waiting Periods for Abortions, GUTTMACHER INST., 
https://www.guttmacher.org/evidence-you-can-use/waiting-periods-abortion (last vis-
ited May 21, 2019). 
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According to the Guttmacher Institute,18 every state requires that a patient pro-
vide informed consent to receive medical treatment, but thirty-four states have 
abortion-specific requirements.19  Of those thirty-four states, thirty states re-
quire that written materials be offered or given to the patient.20  Further, only 
eleven of those states require the physician to give the materials to the patient.21  
Finally, merely three states’ informed consent laws are so stringent as to re-
quire the written materials to include a phrase acknowledging the belief that 
life begins at conception.22  Missouri’s informed consent statute is one of those 
three.23 
B. Common Law Informed Consent 
Informed consent has long been a staple of American tort law.  The com-
mon law doctrine of informed consent stems from “two basic principles of law, 
the fiduciary nature of the physician-patient relationship and the fundamental 
legal principle that a competent individual has a right to determine what will 
be done with his or her body.”24  Traditionally, Missouri requires patients to 
“have a clear understanding of the risks and benefits of the proposed treatment 
alternatives or nontreatment” before making an informed decision.25  The 
longstanding requirement of informed consent is inextricably linked to the 
medical procedure itself.  Avoiding tort liability requires that informed consent 
to the surgery be given as much as it requires the surgery be performed cor-
rectly.26  This relationship between the medical procedure and informed con-
sent categorizes the requirement that a physician provide a patient with certain 
information as professional conduct.27  A physician accomplishes the conduct 
of providing information by speaking or the First Amendment equivalent of 
 
 18. “The Guttmacher Institute is a leading research and policy organization com-
mitted to advancing sexual and reproductive health and rights in the United States and 
globally.”  About Us, GUTTMACHER INST., https://www.guttmacher.org/about (last vis-
ited May 31, 2019). 
 19. Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST., 
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/counseling-and-waiting-periods-
abortion (last updated May 1, 2019). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.  Indiana requires counseling that personhood begins at conception but does 
not require that such a statement be provided in written materials.  Id. 
 23. See MO. REV. STAT. § 188.027 (2018). 
 24. 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons §137, West (database updated Mar. 2019). 
 25. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 417 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (quoting Sid-
ney H. Wanzer, The Physician’s Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients, 310 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 955, 957 (1984)), aff’d sub nom. Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. 
Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 26. See Richard E. Shugrue & Kathryn Linstromberg, The Practitioner’s Guide to 
Informed Consent, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 881, 881–82 (1991). 
 27. See Blythe, supra note 8, at 803–04. 
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speaking – such as providing written materials; however, the mere fact that 
speech provides the only means to accomplish the conduct does not prevent 
that conduct from being considered as professional conduct for purposes of 
constitutional review.28 
C. Missouri’s Informed Consent Statute 
Many states have abortion-specific informed consent laws, but Missouri’s 
statute presents one of the most stringent requirements in the country because 
it requires the physician to disclose a statement that many find controversial.29  
Missouri’s informed consent statute requires that doctors present the patient 
seeking the abortion with certain written information contained in a booklet.30  
Some of the information required to be in the booklet includes 
the probable anatomical and physiological characteristics of the unborn 
child at two-week gestational increments from conception to full term, 
including color photographs or images of the developing unborn child 
at two-week gestational increments.  Such descriptions shall include in-
formation about brain and heart functions, the presence of external 
members and internal organs during the applicable stages of develop-
ment and information on when the unborn child is viable.31 
Most notably, the booklet or printed material must “prominently display 
the following statement: ‘The life of each human being begins at conception.  
Abortion will terminate the life of a separate, unique, living human being.’”32  
The statute does not include a definition for “life” or “human being” to give 
further clarity to the meaning of the mandated phrase.33  However, the meaning 
of “conception” is understood as “the fertilization of the ovum of a female by 
a sperm of a male.”34  Additionally, the booklet acknowledges that Missouri 
law requires the information in the booklet be provided to patients seeking 
abortions.35 
While the statute does not define all terms in the phrase, the Missouri 
General Assembly attempted to further legitimize this statement.  In 1986, the 
General Assembly enacted a statutory preamble, which stated that “[t]he life 
 
 28. Id. at 804. 
 29. See supra text accompanying notes 19–24. 
 30. See MO. REV. STAT. § 188.027 (2018); see also MO. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
SENIOR SERVICES, MISSOURI’S INFORMED CONSENT BOOKLET (2017), 
https://health.mo.gov/living/families/womenshealth/pregnancyassistance/pdf/In-
formedConsentBooklet.pdf [hereinafter INFORMED CONSENT]. 
 31. MO. REV. STAT. § 188.027.1(2). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. § 188.015. 
 34. Id. 
 35. INFORMED CONSENT, supra note 30, at 1. 
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of each human being begins at conception.”36  Shortly after becoming effective 
in 1988, the United States Supreme Court heard a constitutional challenge to 
the preamble as well as other Missouri provisions regulating abortion. 
In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,37 the plaintiffs – five health 
professionals – sought injunctive and declarative relief on the basis that Mis-
souri’s statutory preamble was unconstitutional because it violated the Estab-
lishment Clause, which prevents the government from establishing a religion.38  
The five health professionals who challenged the statutory preamble feared its 
declaration that life began at conception guided the interpretation of other pro-
visions that regulated abortion.39  The health professionals sought injunctive 
relief to prevent the enforcement of the preamble.40  Both the U.S. District 
Court for the Western District of Missouri and the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit found the preamble unconstitutional, relying on dictum from 
the United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade that “‘a State may not adopt 
one theory of when life begins to justify its regulation of abortions.’”41 
However, on review, the United States Supreme Court did not address the 
constitutionality of the preamble because it was not an abortion regulation.42  
The Court noted that “Roe v. Wade ‘implies no limitation on the authority of a 
State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion.’”43  Further, 
the Court acknowledged that the preamble may give rise to standing when it is 
used to interpret other statutes, but the Court cannot decide on future cases.44  
Therefore, the Court did not rule on the constitutionality of Missouri’s statutory 
preamble because the plaintiffs did not have standing when the preamble did 
not restrict the activities of the plaintiffs in some concrete way.45 
D. The First Amendment and Tiered Scrutiny 
Not all constitutional challenges brought by a plaintiff against a statute 
are treated the same.  When determining whether a statute violates the Consti-
 
 36. MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205(1) (2018). 
 37. 492 U.S. 490, 501–02 (1989). 
 38. Id. at 501. 
 39. See id. at 504–05. 
 40. Id. at 501–02. 
 41. Id. at 504 (quoting Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 
U.S. 416, 444 (1983) (quoting Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113, 159–162 (1973))). 
 42. Id. at 506. 
 43. Id. (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 462, 474 (1977)). 
 44. Id. at 506–07. 
 45. Id. at 507.  However, in his dissent, Justice Stevens found standing existed 
and, when deciding on the merits, he would have held that the statutory preamble vio-
lated the Establishment Clause because the preamble “serve[d] no identifiable secular 
purpose.”  Id. at 566–67 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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tution, the Court applies one of three levels of scrutiny: (1) rational basis re-
view; (2) intermediate scrutiny; or (3) strict scrutiny.46  In First Amendment 
cases, the level of scrutiny applied by the court turns on the burden placed on 
speech rights.47  For instance, a statute may seek to only regulate conduct and 
have no burden on speech.48  If a state regulation of conduct does not burden 
free speech or another right that has been deemed a “fundamental liberty” so 
as to be incorporated to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, then the stat-
ute receives rational basis review.49  Further, some regulations on speech – such 
as fighting-words, true threats, and incitement – are unprotected as “low value” 
speech and are sometimes referred to as conduct, also receiving rational basis 
review.50  However, content-based regulations on speech, which regulate 
speech based on what the speaker says, are considered “high-value” speech and 
receive strict scrutiny.51  Finally, content-neutral regulations on speech are 
viewed more leniently under intermediate scrutiny.52 
Because compelled speech statutes are normally content-based re-
strictions, courts review them under strict scrutiny.53  The test for strict scrutiny 
asks whether the statute is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state in-
terest.54  Wooley v. Maynard 55  provides an example of the Court’s use of strict 
scrutiny to a statute that compelled speech.  The statute at issue made it a crime 
to cover up the display of the state’s motto – “Live Free or Die” – on a vehicle’s 
license plate.56  The Court first decided that this was a First Amendment issue 
because the First Amendment protects “the right to speak freely and the right 
to refrain from speaking at all.”57  Additionally, the statute required individuals 
to foster the State’s message by using an individual’s private property as a 
“mobile billboard” for the State’s ideological message.58  Applying strict scru-
tiny, the Court held that the State’s interest of identifying passenger vehicles 
was compelling; however, the statute was not narrowly tailored because there 
 
 46. Erika Schutzman, Note, We Need Professional Help: Advocating for a Con-
sistent Standard of Review When Regulations of Professional Speech Implicate the 
First Amendment, 56 B.C. L. REV. 2019, 2026–28 (2015). 
 47. Id. at 2024–30. 
 48. Id. at 2024–25. 
 49. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). 
 50. RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES AND 
THEORY 95 (3d ed. 2017). 
 51. Id. at 70. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Riley v. Nat’l Fed. of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 798 (1988). 
 54. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015). 
 55. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
 56. Id. at 706–07. 
 57. Id. at 714. 
 58. Id. at 715. 
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were less drastic means to achieve the same purpose.59  Therefore, the Court 
invalidated the law as a violation of First Amendment freedom of speech.60 
On the other hand, rational basis review merely requires the government 
show some rational reason for the legislation.61  One example of the Court’s 
use of rational basis review to evaluate conduct that did not burden a funda-
mental liberty comes from Washington v. Glucksberg.62  In Glucksberg, the 
Court heard a challenge to the State of Washington’s statute banning assisted 
suicide.63  The Court determined that the statute did not involve a fundamental 
liberty because “our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices” consist-
ently condemned assisted suicide.64  Applying rational basis review, the Court 
decided that Washington’s interests in protecting vulnerable patients from co-
ercion, preventing involuntary and voluntary euthanasia, and protecting the in-
tegrity and ethics of the medical profession were rationally related to the pro-
hibition on assisted suicide.65  Therefore, the statute was upheld because it was 
rationally related to the State’s interest and did not involve a fundamental 
right.66 
In some instances, the Court has applied “intermediate scrutiny” in cases 
involving commercial speech where the advertisement was not misleading or 
untruthful.67  Intermediate scrutiny asks if the government asserted a “substan-
tial interest and the interference with speech [was] in proportion to the interest 
served.”68  In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commis-
sion of New York,69  the Court heard a challenge to a state statute that prohibited 
electric utilities from promoting the use of electricity in advertisements.  When 
determining the level of scrutiny, the Court acknowledged that misleading 
commercial speech receives no First Amendment protection, but the Court rea-
soned that truthful advertisements should receive some First Amendment pro-
tection because truthful advertisements serve to inform the public.70  Therefore, 
the Court applied intermediate scrutiny.71  Using intermediate scrutiny, the 
Court determined the State had a substantial interest in energy conservation; 
however, the Court held that the interference with speech was not proportionate 
to the interest served because a ban on all advertisement prevented the ability 
to promote efficient uses of energy as well as those the State wished to curb.72  
 
 59. Id. at 716–17. 
 60. Id. at 717. 
 61. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) 
 62. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 63. Id. at 705–06. 
 64. Id. at 721. 
 65. Id. at 730–33. 
 66. Id. at 735–36. 
 67. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203–07 (1982). 
 68. Id. at 203. 
 69. 447 U.S. 557, 558 (1980). 
 70. Id. at 561–64. 
 71. Id. at 566. 
 72. Id. at 570–71. 
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Further, there were less restrictive ways for the State to promote its interests.73  
Therefore, the Court held that the statute failed intermediate scrutiny and was 
unconstitutional.74 
Occasionally, a regulation of the medical profession – like Glucksberg – 
collides with the First Amendment protection of “high-value” speech – like 
Wooley.  This is evident in informed consent statutes where states have the 
power to regulate the medical profession, leading to rational basis review; how-
ever, these regulations may also touch on speech that is protected by the First 
Amendment, which should be examined under strict scrutiny.  Thus, determin-
ing whether the statute operates as a regulation of speech – receiving strict 
scrutiny – or a regulation of conduct – receiving rational basis review – be-
comes a matter for courts to decide.75 
E. Planned Parenthood v. Casey Precedent and Its Application in Sub-
sequent Cases 
The United States Supreme Court has tackled the issue of informed con-
sent laws and their potential to infringe upon First Amendment rights only once 
– in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.76  This Section examines the Court’s deci-
sion on the issue of compelled speech in Casey.  Then, this Section explains 
the confusion Casey created in the federal circuit courts by examining how 
those courts decided subsequent compelled speech challenges to abortion-spe-
cific informed consent statutes. 
1. Planned Parenthood v. Casey Addresses Compelled Speech in In-
formed Consent Statutes 
In Casey, the United States Supreme Court heard a challenge to a Penn-
sylvania abortion statute that, among other things, required a patient’s informed 
consent before the patient could receive an abortion.77  Five abortion clinics 
and a class of physicians brought the suit seeking injunctive relief against en-
forcement of the statute.78  The statute provided in part that the physician must 
orally inform the patient of certain information, including the medical risk as-
sociated with the procedure, the probable gestational age of the unborn child, 
the nature of the procedure, and alternatives to the procedure.79  Additionally, 
the statute required the physician to inform the patient about the availability of 
written material on the procedure.80 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 231 (1985) (White, J., concurring). 
 76. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 77. Id. at 844. 
 78. Id. at 845. 
 79. Id. at 844 (citing 18 PA. CONST. STAT. § 3205 (1990)). 
 80. Id. at 881 (citing 18 PA. CONST. STAT. § 3205 (1990)). 
9
Essma: Speech as Speech: “Professional Speech” and Missouri’s Informed C
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019
490 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
The Court decided a number of constitutional claims regarding the statute 
but only briefly addressed the statute’s potential infringement on the freedom 
of speech.81  The plurality acknowledged that “the physician’s First Amend-
ment rights not to speak [were] implicated.”82  In making this point, the plural-
ity cited Wooley v. Maynard,83 where the Court held that a statute making it a 
misdemeanor to obscure the state’s motto on a license plate violated the First 
Amendment because the statute forced “individual[s] to participate in the dis-
semination of an ideological message . . . for the express purpose that it be ob-
served and read by the public.”84  However, the plurality decided the physi-
cians’ First Amendment rights were only implicated “as part of the practice of 
medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State.”85  There-
fore, the plurality reasoned that “no constitutional infirmity” occurred because 
the physicians’ rights were subject to reasonable regulation and the disclosure 
was truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant to receiving an abortion.86 
In a lengthy opinion, the plurality considered the abortion clinics’ and 
physicians’ First Amendment challenge to the speech requirements of the phy-
sicians in a single paragraph.87  This cursory dismissal left unclear the standard 
used to determine the constitutionality of compelled speech requirements with 
respect to the regulation of the medical profession.88  Some read the quick de-
termination in Casey to apply rational basis review to the issue of compelled 
speech in informed consent statues because the statute only implicated speech 
as part of its regulation of the medical profession.89  Rodney Smolla, First 
Amendment scholar and dean of the Widener University Delaware Law 
School, however, believed Casey reviewed the statute under strict scrutiny.90  
Smolla attributed the lack of strict scrutiny analysis in Casey to it being an 
“easy case” because the statute was narrowly tailored to serving the compelling 
state interest of patient autonomy.91  Since Casey, federal circuit courts have 
been split on the standard they apply to compelled speech challenges in the 
 
 81. See id. at 884. 
 82. Id. 
 83. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Kathryn E. Meyer, Note, Taking Physicians Out of the Straight Jacket: De-
fending Physician Free Speech Rights by Defining the “Truthful and Nonmisleading” 
Standard, 104 KY. L. J. 353, 353–54 (2015). 
 89. Scott W. Gaylord & Thomas J. Molony, Casey and a Woman’s Right to Know: 
Ultrasounds, Informed Consent, and the First Amendment, 45 CONN. L. REV. 595, 620 
(2012). 
 90. Rodney A. Smolla, Professional Speech and the First Amendment, 119 W. VA. 
L. REV. 67, 81 (2016). 
 91. Id. 
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context of informed consent laws.92  The cases discussed in Section C demon-
strate the void left by Casey’s lack of clarity regarding the appropriate standard 
of review in compelled speech in informed consent statutes. 
2. The Circuit Split 
The lack of clarity in Casey resulted in confusion among the federal cir-
cuit courts in deciding similar informed consent statues.  This Section will il-
lustrate two major cases – one from the Eighth Circuit and the other from the 
Fourth Circuit – that display this confusion.  Further, this Section will explain 
the level of scrutiny applied by each circuit and how they arrived at their dif-
ferent conclusions. 
a. The Strange Application of the Truthful, Nonmisleading, and Relevant Test 
in Planned Parenthood v. Rounds 
The truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant test applied in Casey appeared 
straight-forward – that is, until Planned Parenthood v. Rounds reached the 
Eighth Circuit.93  In Rounds, Planned Parenthood and its medical director sued 
to prevent a South Dakota statute that required certain disclosures of infor-
mation be made to patients to obtain their informed consent before receiving 
an abortion from taking effect.94  The statute required the physician to provide 
the patient, in writing, with information on the abortion procedure, such as the 
name of the physician performing the abortion, the medical risks of the proce-
dure, and the information “[t]hat the abortion will terminate the life of a whole, 
separate, unique, living human being.”95  An additional section defined “human 
being” for purposes of the informed consent statute as “an individual living 
member of the species of Homo sapiens, including the unborn human being 
during the entire embryonic and fetal ages from fertilization to full gestation.”96  
Among other challenges,97 Planned Parenthood contended that the disclosure 
requirements violated the physicians’ free speech rights.98 
 
 92. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th 
Cir. 2008); Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 93. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724. 
 94. Id. at 727. 
 95. Id. at 726 (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1) (2005)). 
 96. Id. at 727 (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-1(4)). 
 97. Planned Parenthood set forth a number of challenges not relevant to this Note. 
Some of those arguments were that the disclosure requirements were unconstitutionally 
vague; that the disclosures unduly burdened patients’ rights to an abortion and violated 
their own free speech rights; and that the health exception in the statute was inadequate.  
Id. 
 98. Id. 
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The U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota originally granted 
Planned Parenthood’s motion for injunction.99  The District of South Dakota 
found that a likelihood of success on the merits existed because the information 
required to be disclosed included an ideological statement that did not pass 
Casey’s test of truthful, non-misleading medical information.100  On appeal, 
the Eighth Circuit affirmed the District of South Dakota’s ruling.101  Then, sit-
ting en banc, the Eighth Circuit, with Judge Raymond W. Gruender writing the 
opinion, vacated and remanded the case back to the district court.102 
The majority began its analysis by acknowledging that the First Amend-
ment protected the right not to speak.103  However, the Eighth Circuit refused 
to give the claim “First Amendment protections” that would require a determi-
nation that the statute was “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.”104  
In denying strict scrutiny, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that Casey did not apply 
strict scrutiny because the plurality “found no violation of the physician’s right 
not to speak, without need for further analysis of whether the requirements 
were narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”105  Further, Casey 
found no violation of the physician’s right to speak “where physicians merely 
were required to give ‘truthful, nonmisleading information’ relevant to the pa-
tient’s decision to have an abortion.”106  Therefore, the Eighth Circuit believed 
strict scrutiny was not available when the information in the required disclosure 
was truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant.107 
Next, the majority addressed whether the required disclosures in the stat-
ute were truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant.108  The majority first noted that 
the phrase “‘that abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, 
living human being’ certainly may be read to make a point in the debate about 
the ethics of abortion” when taken in isolation.109  However, the majority 
pointed out that the statute additionally defined “human being” as “an individ-
ual living member of the species of Homo Sapiens . . . during [its] embryonic 
[or] fetal age.”110  Further, the Eighth Circuit explained “[w]here [a term] is 
 
 99. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 375 F. Supp. 2d 881 (D. 
S.D. 2005), vacated and remanded by 530 F.3d 724. 
 100. Id. at 886–87. 
 101. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 467 F.3d 716 (2006). 
 102. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 726 (8th Cir. 
2008). 
 103. Id. at 733. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 734. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 735. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 735–36 (alterations in original). 
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defined by statute, the statutory definition is controlling.”111  The majority de-
termined that the required disclosures were truthful, nonmisleading, and rele-
vant when read in conjunction with the limiting statutory definition.112  There-
fore, the Eighth Circuit held that plaintiffs could not show a fair chance of pre-
vailing on the merits because the disclosure was truthful, nonmisleading, and 
relevant to the decision to have an abortion.113 
Judge Diana E. Murphy dissented from the majority, arguing that the re-
quired disclosure was a “metaphysical belief.”114  Further, Judge Murphy noted 
that the meaning of the term “human being” was a value judgment and that the 
legislature cannot “establish by fiat that the term ‘human being’ has only bio-
logical connotations.”115  Judge Murphy further noted the judiciary determines 
what violates the Constitution and the legislature cannot “insulate its own laws 
from legitimate judicial challenge.”116  Additionally, Judge Murphy argued that 
there was nothing suggesting that physicians would include the statutory defi-
nition of “human being” with the disclosure.117  Finally, Judge Murphy con-
cluded that even if a physician disclaimed the disclosure, the constitutional de-
fects would not be cured because the patient would likely attribute the views 
to the speaker due to the face-to-face contact the doctor had with the patient.118  
Therefore, the dissent would have affirmed the district court’s injunction be-
cause the statute likely violated the First Amendment when it compelled phy-
sicians to recite a metaphysical belief and the physicians would not be able to 
disclaim the belief due to the face-to-face nature of the interaction.119 
The Eighth Circuit gained support when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit also ruled that statutorily mandated informed consent disclosures 
do not receive strict scrutiny when they provide truthful, nonmisleading, and 
relevant information.120  Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Ser-
vices v. Lakey concerned a Texas statute that required the taking and displaying 
of a sonogram before a patient could receive an abortion.121  Following the 
Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of Casey, the Fifth Circuit held that the Texas 
statute did not violate the physician’s First Amendment rights because taking 
and displaying a sonogram was “the epitome of truthful, non-misleading infor-
mation” and relevant to a woman’s decision-making.122  While the Fifth Circuit 
 
 111. Id. at 735 (alterations in original) (citing Bruggeman v. S.D. Chem. Depend-
ency Counselor Certification Bd., 571 N.W.2d 851, 853 (S.D. 1997)). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 742 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 115. Id. at 744. 
 116. Id. at 745 (citing Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velasquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548 (2001)). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 746–47. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 576–
78 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 121. Id. at 757. 
 122. Id. at 758. 
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adopted the Eighth Circuit’s approach, other circuits expressed disapproval of 
the decision. 
b. Stuart v. Camnitz Changes Course and Applies Intermediate Scrutiny Us-
ing a Sliding-Scale Test 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit took a different approach 
from the Eighth Circuit when it applied intermediate scrutiny to review an in-
formed consent for abortion statute.123  In Stuart v. Camnitz,124 the Fourth Cir-
cuit heard a challenge to a North Carolina statute requiring physicians “to per-
form an ultrasound, display the sonogram, and describe the fetus to women 
seeking abortions.”  Plaintiffs – physicians and abortion providers – claimed 
the statute violated their First Amendment free speech rights.125  The U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Middle District of North Carolina agreed and granted sum-
mary judgment, entering a permanent injunction to prevent enforcement of the 
requirement to display and describe the sonogram.126 
On appeal, the majority first reasoned that the display of the sonogram 
was an expressive act because North Carolina’s  intent was to discourage abor-
tions and make women reconsider their decisions.127  The Fourth Circuit noted 
that the statute required only the disclosure of factual information.128  However, 
the Fourth Circuit decided that even though the compelled speech was factual, 
“that [did] not divorce the speech from its moral or ideological implica-
tions.”129 
Having decided that the statute constituted compelled ideological speech, 
the Fourth Circuit examined the level of scrutiny to apply.130  The Fourth Cir-
cuit first recognized that North Carolina had power to regulate the medical pro-
fession, including regulation of speech within the profession; however, “that 
[did] not mean that individuals simply abandon their First Amendment rights 
when they commence practicing a profession.”131  The Fourth Circuit then ex-
plained that the stringency of review rested on a sliding scale between profes-
sional speech and professional conduct.132  The majority further reasoned that 
this case had requirements of both speech and conduct.133  Therefore, because 
the disclosure requirement fell somewhere in the middle on the sliding scale, 
the district court’s use of intermediate scrutiny was correct.134 
 
 123. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 124. Id. at 242. 
 125. Id. at 243. 
 126. Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d 585, 611 (M.D.N.C. 2014). 
 127. Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 245. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 246. 
 130. Id. at 248. 
 131. Id. at 247. 
 132. Id. at 248. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 249. 
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss2/8
2019] SPEECH AS SPEECH 495 
The Fourth Circuit rejected the Eighth Circuit’s application of rational 
basis review to address compelled physician speech in the abortion regulation 
in Rounds, stating that “the plurality [in Casey] did not hold sweepingly that 
all regulation of speech in the medical context merely receives rational basis 
review.”135  The Fourth Circuit further noted that Casey only addressed the 
issue of compelled physician speech in a single paragraph.136  Additionally, the 
Fourth Circuit reasoned that “[t]he fact that a regulation does not impose an 
undue burden on a woman under the due process clause does not answer the 
question of whether it imposes an impermissible burden on the physician under 
the First Amendment.”137  Therefore, the Fourth Circuit concluded that despite 
a different holding in the Eighth Circuit, intermediate scrutiny was consistent 
with United States Supreme Court precedent, including the plurality opinion in 
Casey.138 
Under intermediate scrutiny, the test applied by the Fourth Circuit asked 
whether “the statute directly advance[d] a substantial government interest and 
. . . the measure [was] drawn to achieve that interest.”139  The Fourth Circuit 
recognized a few compelling state interests, such as the protection of fetal life, 
the protection of a patient’s physical and psychological health, and the im-
portance of ensuring a patient’s decision is well-informed.140  The Fourth Cir-
cuit, however, concluded that the means exceeded what was proper because 
“states cannot so compromise physicians’ free speech rights, professional judg-
ment, patient autonomy, and other important state interests in the process.”141  
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of plaintiffs’ 
summary judgment motion because the statute impermissibly compelled 
speech in order to achieve its interest.142 
The Fourth Circuit’s use of a sliding-scale test to determine the level of 
scrutiny to apply was not anomalous to tests used by other federal circuit courts 
when determining the level of protection to grant professional speech.  In fact, 
several federal circuit courts used sliding-scale tests to review regulations of 
 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 250 (citing Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011)). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 255. 
 142. Id. at 255–56. 
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professional speech within the context of the medical profession.143  Specifi-
cally, the Fourth Circuit based its sliding scale off of a test created by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Pickup v. Brown.144 
In Pickup, the Ninth Circuit heard a challenge to a California statute that 
forbade psychologists from providing therapy that sought to change the sexual 
orientation of minors.145  The providers of the treatment argued that the statute 
violated their First Amendment right to free speech because the statute prohib-
ited psychologists from engaging in talk therapy.146  The Ninth Circuit upheld 
the statute because it decided regulation of talk therapy primarily regulated 
conduct and not First Amendment protected speech even though the conduct 
consisted of speech.147 
To aid in its determination of the level of protection to afford speech, the 
Ninth Circuit created a continuum that balances the First Amendment rights of 
professionals and the State’s ability to regulate professional conduct.148  At one 
end of the continuum, professional speech outside of the practice of the profes-
sion – known as “public dialogue” – was subject to strict scrutiny.149  On the 
other end of the continuum, speech used in the course of treatment – which was 
ultimately considered conduct – was subject to rational basis review.150  The 
Ninth Circuit considered speech between a professional and a client within the 
context of the professional’s occupation but not in the course of treatment to 
be at the midpoint.151  Speech between a professional and a client was still 
within an individual’s professional capacity, but it was not within the course of 
treatment so as to be labeled conduct.152  The Ninth Circuit only explained that 
the midpoint of professional speech received “somewhat diminished” First 
Amendment protection.153  Further, the Ninth Circuit noted that informed con-
sent for abortion statutes fell at that midpoint.154  Finally, the Ninth Circuit 
upheld the California statute under rational basis review because it determined 
 
 143. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1227–29 (9th Cir. 2014), abrogated by Nat’l 
Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); King v. Governor 
of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 233 (3d Cir. 2014) (“While the function of this speech does not 
render it ‘conduct’ that is wholly outside the scope of the First Amendment, it does 
place it within a recognized category of speech that is not entitled to full protection of 
the First Amendment.”); Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1218–26 
(11th Cir. 2014), vacated and superseded on reh’g 797 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 144. Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 248; Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1227–29. 
 145. Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1215. 
 146. Id. at 1219. 
 147. Id. at 1231. 
 148. Id. at 1227–29. 
 149. Id. at 1227. 
 150. Id. at 1229. 
 151. Id. at 1228. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
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that talk therapy fell into the category of conduct, receiving the least amount 
of protection.155 
Thus, when deciding Stuart, the Fourth Circuit placed the display and ex-
planation of the sonogram requirement in the middle of the Pickup sliding 
scale; however, the Fourth Circuit arrived at this conclusion because it believed 
the statute regulated both conduct – showing the sonogram – and speech – dis-
cussing the sonogram.156  But this was incorrect.157  The display and explana-
tion of the sonogram requirement fell at the midpoint because it was not a part 
of the treatment but was still within the confines of the physician-client rela-
tionship.  Further, the Fourth Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny when the 
Ninth Circuit’s determination on the level of scrutiny was far from conclu-
sive.158  The United States Supreme Court ultimately rejected the sliding-scale 
test and the lessened protection for professional speech when it abrogated 
Pickup in its decision of Becerra.159 
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
The Court’s recent holding in National Institute of Family and Life Advo-
cates v. Becerra changed how courts will examine informed consent statutes 
in the context of abortion because the Court eliminated the midpoint category 
for speech between a client and professional.160  There was confusion amongst 
the federal circuit courts in distinguishing First Amendment protected speech 
and professional conduct, and as a result, the federal circuit courts essentially 
created a separate category for speech within the context of the profession.161  
The Court directly addressed this confusion in Becerra.162  This Part explains 
the decision in Becerra and examines how the Court distinguished First 
Amendment protected speech from professional conduct. 
 
 155. Id. at 1232. 
 156. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 248 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 250; Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1228. 
 159. Nat’l Inst. of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 
(2018).  It should be noted that the Court in Becerra abrogated Pickup v. Brown – but 
only as to the sliding-scale test.  Id.  Becerra essentially eliminated the midpoint on the 
sliding scale test that established a category of protection for “speech within the con-
fines of [the] professional relationship.”  Id. (quoting Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1228).  It does 
not stand to reason that Becerra invalidated the California statute prohibiting the use of 
talk therapy to change the sexual orientation of minors because the Ninth Circuit placed 
that statute on the far end of the spectrum dealing with conduct.  Under Becerra, the 
California statute should be upheld as a regulation of conduct, but that will not be dis-
cussed any further in this Note. 
 160. Id. at 2371–72. 
 161. See Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1227–28. 
 162. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371–72. 
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In Becerra,163 the Court clarified its holding in Casey regarding com-
pelled speech when it heard a challenge to a California’s “FACT Act” that, 
ironically,164 regulated pro-life crisis pregnancy centers.  The “FACT Act” re-
quired these crisis pregnancy centers to distribute a “government-drafted no-
tice” to all clients that stated the availability of public programs for family 
planning services, prenatal care, and abortion for eligible women.165  Plaintiffs, 
composed of both licensed and unlicensed pregnancy centers, claimed the 
FACT Act violated their free speech by compelling them to give clients this 
information.166  The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California 
denied plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, and the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed, holding that regulations of “professional speech” received a lower level 
of scrutiny.167 
The Court first explained that content-based regulations normally receive 
strict scrutiny.168  The Court then decided that the FACT Act was a content-
based regulation because it “alter[ed] the content” of plaintiffs’ speech by re-
quiring them to inform clients of abortion options that plaintiffs strongly op-
posed.169  Thus, by requiring plaintiffs to speak when they normally would not, 
the statute altered the content of their speech.170 
The Court next rejected an exception for “professional speech” created 
by some federal circuit courts.171  This exception allowed the Ninth Circuit to 
review content-based regulations under a standard lower than strict scrutiny 
when it regulated a professional’s “expert knowledge and judgment” or speech 
that was “within the confines of [the] professional relationship.”172  The Court 
held that “professional speech” was not a separate category of speech entitled 
to less protection, stating that “[s]peech is not unprotected merely because it is 
uttered by ‘professionals.’”173  However, the Court carved out two exceptions 
to this general rule where it would apply a lower level of scrutiny.174 
The first exception arose from a narrow subset of cases regulating “com-
mercial speech.”175  Emanating from Zaurderer v. Office of Disciplinary Coun-
sel of the Supreme Court of Ohio,176 the Court determined that this exception 
 
 163. Id. at 2368. 
 164. Crisis pregnancy centers are generally run by pro-life organizations with the 
intent to discourage women from having abortions.  Id. 
 165. Id. at 2369. 
 166. Id. at 2370. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 2371. 
 169. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 
487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988)). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. (citing Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1227–29 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
 173. Id. at 2371–72. 
 174. Id. at 2372. 
 175. Id. 
 176. 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
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would occur when the regulation “governed only ‘commercial advertising’ and 
required the disclosure of ‘purely factual and uncontroversial information . . . 
.’”177  In cases meeting the Zauderer standard, the Court held that the “require-
ments should be upheld unless they are ‘unjustified or unduly burdensome.’”178  
The Court determined that the Zauderer standard did not apply here because 
abortion is a controversial topic.179 
The second exception was reserved for “regulations of professional con-
duct that incidentally burden[ed] speech.”180  The Court noted that Casey was 
an example of this exception because the statute in Casey only regulated speech 
“as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regu-
lation by the state.”181  The statute in Casey regulated the conduct of physicians 
because it required informed consent before receiving a procedure.182  Further, 
the Court explained that informed consent statutes regulate conduct because 
“the requirement that a doctor obtain informed consent to perform an abortion 
is ‘firmly entrenched in American tort law.’”183  Therefore, the statute in Casey 
incidentally burdened speech by regulating the process for obtaining a medical 
procedure, which the Court considered professional conduct.184 
Here, however, the regulation required distribution of the information to 
all clients of the crisis pregnancy centers and was not tied to a procedure.185  
Therefore, the FACT Act did not fall within the second exception because it 
regulated speech – not conduct.186  Since California’s FACT Act did not meet 
the requirements of either exception, the Court held that strict scrutiny was 
appropriate.187  The Court ultimately determined the statute did not survive 
even intermediate scrutiny because the statute did not sufficiently achieve the 
State’s interest of “providing low-income women with information about state-
sponsored services.”188 
IV. COMMENT 
In Becerra, the Court established a uniform standard for the proper level 
of scrutiny to apply when considering the doctrine of professional speech and 
thus resolved the contentious split that had developed between several federal 
circuit courts.189  This clarity should change the analysis of informed consent 
 
 177. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2372 (citing Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651). 
 178. Id. (citing Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 2373. 
 181. Id. (alteration in original). 
 182. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992). 
 183. Id. (quoting Cruzan v. Dir. of Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990)). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 2374. 
 188. Id. at 2375. 
 189. See supra Part III. 
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statues, including Missouri’s statute.  While Becerra clearly contemplated the 
type of speech requirements of the informed consent statute in Casey,190 in-
formed consent statutes – like Missouri’s – present a different type of challenge 
that the Court’s decision could address because those informed consent statutes 
are tied to the medical procedure. 
First, this Part analyzes the Missouri informed consent statute using the 
least stringent test applied – a test that comes from Rounds.191  Specifically, 
this Part asserts that, even under Rounds, the Missouri statute does not pass 
constitutional muster; however, this Part also argues that Rounds improperly 
interpreted Casey.  Second, this Part demonstrates that the analysis of profes-
sional speech in Becerra differed from Rounds.  This Part contends that Mis-
souri’s requirement of displaying an ideological statement on materials handed 
to patients presents more than an “incidental burden” on speech and therefore 
deserves strict scrutiny.  Further, this Part rejects the use of intermediate scru-
tiny in Stuart and examines how Becerra applies to the display and explanation 
of the sonogram requirements from Stuart.  Ultimately, this Part argues that 
required disclosures in the Missouri informed consent statute should be viewed 
differently based on whether the disclosure extends beyond traditional in-
formed consent disclosures or whether the disclosure is an ideological one. 
A. Missouri’s Informed Consent Statute According to Rounds 
The provision in Missouri’s informed consent statute mandating that the 
physician give the patient material expressing the State’s view of when life 
begins is unlikely to survive if the Eighth Circuit’s approach in Rounds is ap-
plied because the Missouri statute does not contain the same statutory safe-
guard as the statute analyzed in Rounds.  The South Dakota statute upheld in 
Rounds was remarkably similar to the Missouri informed consent statute.192  
Most notably, both statutes mandated phrases warning the patient that an abor-
tion terminates the life of a separate human being.193  However, unlike the 
phrase mandated by the South Dakota statute, the Missouri statute does not 
provide a statutory definition for “human being” or “life.”  In fact, Judge 
Gruender’s majority opinion in Rounds acknowledged that the statement could 
be problematic because “[t]aken in isolation [the statute’s] language . . . cer-
tainly may be read to make a point in the debate about the ethics of abortion.”194 
 
 190. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2373 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 884).  
 191. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 
2008). 
 192. See discussion supra Sections II.C, II.E.2.a. 
 193. See discussion supra Sections II.C, II.E.2.a. 
 194. Rounds, 530 F.3d at 735 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (first alteration in original). 
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As the dissent, and other courts,195 suggested, the determination of when 
life begins is a “metaphysical belief.”196  Because this is a topic rife with de-
bate, no single determination of the beginning of life exists as truthful or non-
misleading.  Therefore, the Missouri statute fails the truthful, nonmisleading, 
and relevant test of Casey because it does not possess the statutory safeguard 
contained in the South Dakota statute.  According to Rounds, the statute should 
be examined under strict scrutiny after being found to be non-truthful or mis-
leading. 
Under strict scrutiny, Missouri’s informed consent statute must be nar-
rowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.197  The Court in Casey rec-
ognized two substantial interests of states in requiring informed consent for 
abortions: (1) the health of the woman making the decision to have an abortion 
and (2) the protection of potential life.198  The State’s interest in protecting the 
health of the woman includes the protection her physical and psychological 
health, as devastating psychological damage can result if a woman receives an 
abortion only to discover her decision was not fully informed.199  The State 
may protect potential life by ensuring a woman makes an informed decision, 
which includes knowing the fetal development of the unborn child “even when 
in doing so the State expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion.”200 
Compelling interests clearly exist for Missouri to regulate abortion 
through informed consent laws; however, the provision requiring physicians to 
hand patients a booklet explaining that life begins at conception does not serve 
any of these interests because the State’s compelling interests must rest on the 
information presented being factual.  In contrast, these booklets provide only 
controversial information that many physicians consider to be incorrect – di-
rectly confusing and misinforming the patient.  Therefore, disclosure of the 
statement that life begins at conception serves no compelling state interest be-
cause the statement is neither truthful nor nonmisleading. 
This straightforward analysis affirms that once one determines that the 
information is not truthful, the requirement cannot pass strict scrutiny.  As 
noted by the U.S. District Court for the District Court of Nebraska, the Eighth 
Circuit’s application of strict scrutiny once the court determines that the infor-
mation is not truthful does not logically follow the opinion in Casey.201  The 
Eighth Circuit’s logical framework is flawed because “it is hard to imagine 
 
 195. See, e.g., Acuna v. Turkish, 930 A.2d 416, 427 (N.J. 2007) (noting the “deep 
societal and philosophical divide” concerning “the profound issue of when life be-
gins.”); Doe v. Planned Parenthood/Chi. Area, 956 N.E.2d 564, 573 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) 
(“[A] difference in scientific, moral, or philosophical viewpoint on the issue of when 
life begins is virtually guaranteed . . . .”). 
 196. Rounds, 530 F.3d at 742 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 197. Reed v. Town of Gilbert 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015). 
 198. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 883. 
 201. Planned Parenthood of Heartland v. Heineman, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1048 
n.18 (D. Neb. 2010). 
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how compelling a physician to provide information that is untrue, misleading, 
or irrelevant could ever survive strict scrutiny.”202  Further, Casey’s test requir-
ing the disclosure be truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant is a formulation of 
rational basis review.203  Given the tiered nature of the Court’s scrutiny, a stat-
ute failing rational basis review always fails strict scrutiny.  The Eighth Cir-
cuit’s use of strict scrutiny on a statute failing rational basis review is incon-
sistent with Casey and ultimately superfluous.  Therefore, because reviewing 
the statute under strict scrutiny after it failed rational basis review is superflu-
ous, courts should not test a statute under rational basis review to decide 
whether to review it under strict scrutiny. 
While the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Rounds likely invalidates the pro-
vision of Missouri’s informed consent statute requiring a physician to state that 
life begins at conception, Rounds still provides little protection to a physician’s 
speech.  The lack of protection stems from the Missouri General Assembly’s 
ability to insulate the Missouri statutory provision by defining words like “life” 
or “human being.”  The General Assembly could simply adopt the same defi-
nition of human being provided by the South Dakota statute and render the 
statute constitutional.  As identified by the dissent, adding a definition of hu-
man being provides little protection of a physician’s right not to speak the 
State’s ideological view because use of the statutory definition of human being 
in the actual disclosure is unlikely.204 
Additionally, patients bring an array of subjective understandings of the 
term human being that likely differ from the statutory definition.205  This deci-
sion provides little comfort, however, because the legislature can easily cir-
cumvent constitutional protections by establishing an equally controversial 
definition of human being. 
B. Evaluating Stuart’s Increased Protection of Physician Speech 
On the end of the spectrum, opposite Rounds, Stuart provides signifi-
cantly greater protection to physician speech rights because it applies interme-
diate scrutiny to informed consent statutes.  In Stuart, the Fourth Circuit 
adopted the Ninth Circuit’s and the Eleventh Circuit’s sliding-scale approach 
to reviewing professional speech.206  This sliding-scale approach derived from 
Pickup v. Brown.207 
The Fourth Circuit’s analysis of the display and explanation of a sono-
gram requirement under the sliding-scale approach invalidated a statute that 
 
 202. Gaylord & Molony, supra note 89, at 626 n.197. 
 203. Id. at 640. 
 204. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 745 (8th Cir. 
2008) (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 205. Id. 
 206. See discussion supra Section II.E.2.b. 
 207. See Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 248 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Pickup v. 
Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1227, 1229 (9th Cir. 2014), abrogated by Nat’l Inst. of Family 
& Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018)). 
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infringed on the physician’s speech less than the Missouri statute.208  The Mis-
souri statute requires the physician to communicate a message that is clearly 
ideological, whereas the sonogram display and explanation requirements man-
dated disclosure of factual information and did not explicitly state an ideolog-
ical view but had “ideological implications.”209  Since the Missouri statute im-
pinges on the physician’s speech rights more significantly than the display and 
explanation of a sonogram, the Fourth Circuit’s approach would almost cer-
tainly invalidate the Missouri statute.  However, the Fourth Circuit misapplied 
the Ninth Circuit’s sliding-scale.  Further, the United States Supreme Court 
specifically rejected this sliding-scale test.210  Therefore, the test applied by the 
Fourth Circuit carries no weight because it misapplied a test that the United 
States Supreme Court rejected. 
C. How Becerra Clarified the Court’s Analysis of Professional Speech 
The Court explained the doctrine of professional speech when it elimi-
nated the midpoint for speech in the context of a profession and asserted that 
professional speech receives lower scrutiny in only two circumstances.  In 
Becerra, the Court dismissed the sliding-scale test used in Pickup because the 
midpoint of the test provided heightened protection for what the Court called 
“professional speech.”211  As the Court noted, “Speech is not unprotected 
merely because it is uttered by ‘professionals.’”212  The First Amendment fully 
protects speech unless it is (1) commercial speech or (2) professional con-
duct.213  Further, regulation of professional conduct must only “incidentally 
burden speech.”214  As previously stated, the Court decided commercial speech 
applied to a narrow subset of cases governing commercial advertising.215  
Clearly, informed consent statutes do not fall under this exception.  The Court, 
however, contemplated informed consent statutes falling under the second ex-
ception: professional conduct.216 
1. Professional Conduct 
The Court recognized speech compelled to provide information in the 
context of an informed consent law restricted speech “only as part of the prac-
tice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State.”217  
 
 208. See discussion supra Section II.E.2.b. 
 209. Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 246. 
 210. See discussion supra Section II.E.2.b. 
 211. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371–72.  
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 2371. 
 214. Id. at 2373. 
 215. Id. at 2372. 
 216. Id. at 2373. 
 217. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992). 
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The Court further elucidated the distinction between speech and conduct by 
finding that a law that required emergency pregnancy centers to provide infor-
mation to patients regarding the availability of abortion clinics violated First 
Amendment free speech when doing so was not connected to a medical proce-
dure.218  Therefore, when connected with a medical procedure, a law requiring 
disclosure of certain information is professional conduct that receives rational 
basis review. 
While informed consent laws are conduct – and not speech – legislatures 
cannot require the physician to communicate anything the legislature would 
like under the guise of an informed consent law.  As the Fourth Circuit ob-
served, Casey “did not hold sweepingly that all regulation of speech in the 
medical context merely receives rational basis review.”219  The informed con-
sent requirements of the statute in Casey followed traditional informed consent 
disclosures, such as “the nature of the procedure [and] the health risks of the 
abortion and of childbirth.”220  It can hardly be read that the holding in Casey 
extends well beyond traditional informed consent disclosures.  Further, nine 
years before she co-authored the plurality opinion in Casey, along with Justices 
David H. Souter and Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
stated that “[t]his is not to say that the informed consent provisions may not 
violate the First Amendment rights of the physician if the State requires him or 
her to communicate its ideology.”221 
Ultimately, the decision in Becerra clearly identified the point when dis-
closures mandated by informed consent laws become a First Amendment vio-
lation and not a state’s regulation of professional conduct.  An informed con-
sent law is a regulation of professional conduct only when it incidentally bur-
dens a physician’s right to speech.222  Therefore, when an informed consent 
law directly burdens speech – as opposed to incidental burdens that occur when 
providing a patient certain information – the law should be subject to strict 
scrutiny. 
2. Incidental Burdens on Speech v. Regulations of “Speech as Speech” 
To determine the level of scrutiny to apply, courts face the difficult task 
of drawing a line between informed consent laws that present an incidental 
burden on speech in order to regulate conduct and informed consent laws that 
directly burden speech by compelling adherence to the State’s message.  Justice 
Antonin G. Scalia addressed this critical distinction in the context of requiring 
 
 218. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2373. 
 219. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 249 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 220. Casey, 505 U.S. at 881. 
 221. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 472 
n.16 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting), overruled by Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 222. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2373. 
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a publishing company to pay a general tax in order to stay in business.223  Jus-
tice Scalia opined that if the burden placed on printing “is not the object of the 
tax but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise 
valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended.”224  Alternatively, 
the Court in Becerra applied strict scrutiny because the statute regulated 
“speech as speech” when the mandated disclosure was not associated with a 
medical procedure.225  Therefore, when an informed consent disclosure only 
attempts to regulate a medical procedure, the legislature regulates conduct 
while only incidentally burdening speech and rational basis review is appropri-
ate.  But when the object of the disclosure is to compel the physician to com-
municate the State’s message, the legislature regulates speech as speech and 
such disclosures must be subject to strict scrutiny. 
Indeed, legislatures aim traditional informed consent disclosures – such 
as the one involved in Casey – at providing the patient information related to 
the medical procedure.  This serves goals other than compelling the physician 
to communicate the legislature’s beliefs, such as the goals of protecting patient 
autonomy, maintaining medical standards, and safeguarding the patient’s phys-
ical and psychological health.  The only way for the legislature to accomplish 
its goal of providing information is by requiring the physician to speak.  This 
creates an incidental burden on speech because this regulation of professional 
conduct also burdens the physician’s speech.  While the legislature’s object is 
not to compel speech, compelling speech is the means to reaching the legisla-
ture’s valid aim of regulating conduct.  However, when the State’s object is to 
communicate the State’s message, then the statute regulates speech as speech 
and must be analyzed under the First Amendment protection of strict scru-
tiny.226  When determining if the legislature’s object is to compel speech, courts 
should consider whether the disclosure falls within traditional informed con-
sent disclosures or whether the disclosure requires a physician to express an 
ideological view. 
a. Traditional Informed Consent Disclosures 
Informed consent is a “prerequisite” for a medical procedure, and a phy-
sician’s failure to obtain informed consent leads to a cause of action for medical 
malpractice.227  Traditionally, informed consent disclosures require a physician 
 
 223. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2374. 
 226. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406–11 (1989) (rejecting Texas’ 
stated interest in “preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity” to 
justify its criminal sanctions for flag desecration because the interest was not “uncon-
nected to expression”); see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 439 (1963) (“For a 
state may not, under the guise of prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore constitu-
tional rights.”). 
 227. 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons §136, West (database updated Mar. 2019). 
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to provide a patient enough information to “give an intelligent, informed con-
sent to [a] proposed medical treatment or . . . procedure.”228  This includes 
disclosing the nature of the procedure, the risks and benefits, and the probable 
consequences of the procedure.229  Additionally, the issue of the fetus’ status 
as appropriate for informed consent is highly contested, and one court rejected 
the idea that a physician needed to advise a patient seeking an abortion that a 
human fetus is an existing human being because there is no consensus in the 
medical profession or in the public that life begins at conception.230 
As previously noted, courts considered informed consent disclosures to 
be professional conduct because the long history of tort actions for failure to 
provide informed consent intertwined the disclosures with the underlying sur-
gery.231  Naturally, reviewing the disclosures that tort law understood to 
properly produce informed consent provides an idea of which disclosures are 
properly classified as conduct.  Indeed, as reasoning for upholding the statute 
in Casey, the plurality noted that the Pennsylvania statute was “no different 
from a requirement that a doctor give certain specific information about any 
medical procedure.”232  Traditional informed consent disclosures have long 
been regarded as accomplishing the goals of protecting patient autonomy, 
maintaining standards of the medical profession, and safeguarding the physical 
and psychological health of the patient.233  Required disclosures beyond tradi-
tional informed consent disclosures should be viewed suspiciously because tra-
ditional informed consent disclosures already accomplish the legitimate inter-
ests of the State in regulating the medical practice.  Because traditional in-
formed consent disclosures already accomplish the State’s objectives in its in-
formed consent laws, the presence of additional mandated disclosures suggests 
that the State has other objectives, and those objectives may involve regulating 
speech as speech. 
This, however, is not to say that all disclosures exceeding traditional in-
formed consent disclosures seek to regulate speech as speech.  For example, 
the Court in Casey held that states may require physicians to provide infor-
mation regarding the development of the fetus even though the consequences 
do not relate to the patient directly and doing so allows states to express a pref-
erence for childbirth over abortion.234  The Court likened this type of disclosure 
to providing a patient seeking a kidney transplant with information of the risks 
to the kidney donor.235  The unique circumstances of an abortion may allow for 
some extension of traditional informed consent disclosures – like providing a 
 
 228. Id. § 141. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Acuna v. Turkish, 930 A.2d 416, 427 (N.J. 2007). 
 231. See discussion supra Section II.B. 
 232. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992). 
 233. See discussion supra Section II.B. 
 234. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882. 
 235. Id. at 882–83. 
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booklet consisting of illustrations of the development of the fetus – but it does 
not allow states to mandate a physician to say whatever the state would like. 
The statutes in both Rounds and Stuart presented examples of disclosures 
that extended well beyond traditional informed consent disclosures.  The re-
quirement that a physician display and explain a sonogram in Stuart ventured 
so far beyond traditional informed consent disclosures as to require the patient 
to undergo an additional medical procedure.236  Further, forcing a patient to 
undergo a sonogram can hardly be considered to advance the goal of patient 
autonomy that traditional informed consent disclosures championed.237  Like-
wise, the mandated disclosure in Rounds that a life begins at conception ex-
tends beyond the disclosure of risks and benefits associated with the procedure, 
albeit more subtly than the requirement to display and explain a sonogram to 
the patient.238  As the Supreme Court of New Jersey concluded, informed con-
sent disclosures do not traditionally include statements lacking consensus in 
the medical field or public in general.239  Therefore, because the disclosures in 
both Stuart and Rounds extend beyond traditional informed consent disclo-
sures, the statutes likely move beyond regulating professional conduct and may 
actually regulate speech as speech.  Examining the extent to which a mandated 
disclosure exceeds traditional informed consent helps show when the State’s 
object is likely to ensure the compelled disclosure communicates its ideologi-
cal message – as opposed to merely ensuring the patient is informed of the 
procedure. 
b. Ideological Disclosures 
When a legislature compels ideological speech, the government likely 
does not advance an interest in regulation of professional conduct because the 
government primarily seeks dissemination of its ideological view.  The Court 
has long been wary of government regulations that require affirmance of its 
ideologies or beliefs.240  The Court has observed that laws compelling ideolog-
ical speech “pose the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a 
legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or 
 
 236. See Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 237. See id. at 255 (“This provision, however, finds the patient half-naked or dis-
robed on her back on an examination table, with an ultrasound probe either on her belly 
or inserted into her vagina.”). 
 238. See Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 726 (8th 
Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 239. Acuna v. Turkish, 930 A.2d 416, 425–26 (N.J. 2007). 
 240. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (rejecting the State’s 
interest in communicating an appreciation of history, state pride, and individualism be-
cause the interest was not “ideologically neutral”); see also W.V. State Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding a requirement that students in public schools 
salute the flag with the pledge of allegiance violated the first amendment because it 
compelled “students to declare a belief”); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 
622, 641 (1994). 
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manipulate the public debate through coercion rather than persuasion.”241  By 
mandating the disclosure of a belief or ideological statement, the legislature 
signals that its aim is to promote a certain ideology by compelling speech, 
thereby regulating speech as speech. 
While ideological disclosures indicate that an informed consent law reg-
ulates speech as speech, the difficulty lies in determining if the disclosure is in 
fact ideological.  For example, the Eighth Circuit in Rounds held a disclosure 
was not ideological because it communicated factual information,242 but the 
Fourth Circuit in Stuart held that factual statements “d[id] not divorce the 
speech from its moral or ideological implications.”243  The Court has often 
found an ideological message to exist when the speaker disagrees with the 
viewpoint or finds it unacceptable.244  Still, “[i]t is possible to convey infor-
mation about ideologically charged subjects without communicating another’s 
ideology.”245  However, merely looking to see if the disclosure provides any 
factual information is insufficient because, as the Fourth Circuit noted, 
“[t]hough the information conveyed may be strictly factual, the context sur-
rounding the delivery of it promotes the viewpoint the State wishes to encour-
age.”246  Thus, while informed consent laws may facially appear to only pro-
vide information, they may actually assert the State’s ideological view. 
In the United States Supreme Court’s line of cases regarding labor unions, 
the Court prohibited compelling adherence to views that had “ideological col-
oration” and were not “germane” to the State’s justification.247  A similar eval-
uation is appropriate for informed consent disclosures.  Courts should decide 
whether the disclosure promotes the State’s ideological view and whether the 
disclosure is germane to obtaining the patient’s informed consent.  Information 
germane to obtaining a patient’s informed consent is information that would 
help her decision to receive an abortion. 
When considering the statutory definitions of abortion and human being 
in the South Dakota statute at issue in Rounds, the mandatory disclosure reads 
“[t]hat the [use of any means . . . to cause the death of a fetus] will terminate 
the life of a whole, separate, unique, living”248 “member of the species of Homo 
Sapien . . . during the entire embryonic and fetal ages . . . .”249  That causing 
the death of a fetus terminates the life of a fetus seems obvious to the average 
adult and provides little information to aid the patient seeking an abortion.  
When read without the statutory definitions, the disclosure is plainly an ideo-
logical statement because it hits at the heart of the abortion debate, which is 
 
 241. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 641. 
 242. Rounds, 530 F.3d at 748.  
 243. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 246 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 244. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717; see also Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624. 
 245. Eubanks v. Schmidt, 126 F. Supp. 2d 451, 458 n.11 (W.D. Ky. 2000). 
 246. Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 253. 
 247. See, e.g., Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 15 (1990). 
 248. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(b) (2005). 
 249. Id. § 34-23A-1(4). 
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determining when life begins.  A disclosure that facially appears to make con-
troversial comments regarding the beginning of life certainly promotes the 
State’s ideological view.  Therefore, because the disclosure provides the patient 
little information to help her decision to receive an abortion when read with its 
limiting definitions and because the disclosure is ideological when read with-
out the limiting definitions, the informed consent statute constitutes an ideo-
logical disclosure. 
Similarly, the sonogram display and explanation requirements at issue in 
Stuart provide the patient information but also promote the State’s ideological 
view on abortion.  Even though the Fourth Circuit believed the underlying pur-
pose of the sonogram display and explanation requirement was to promote the 
State’s ideology,250 the requirement also provided the patients with information 
as to the development of the patient’s fetus at the time the patient sought the 
abortion.  However, the North Carolina statute required display and explana-
tion of a sonogram even when the patient refused to listen and covered her ears 
and eyes.251  The requirement that the physician display and explain the pa-
tient’s sonogram provided the patient minimal information to help her decision 
when the patient shielded herself from the message, thus “it [could not] inform 
her decision.”252  Simply requiring physicians to offer patients the opportunity 
to have a sonogram and listen to the physician’s explanation of it would not be 
considered an ideological disclosure because the patient would receive infor-
mation germane to her decision to receive an abortion.  However, statutes that 
require a physician to display and explain a patient’s sonogram, even when the 
patient does not want the sonogram and refuses to watch and listen, should be 
considered ideological disclosures because, in the context of a patient that is an 
unwilling participant, doing so provides little information and yet promotes the 
State’s ideological viewpoint.  Ideally, statutes would require physicians to of-
fer the woman the option to view a sonogram but not force the woman to re-
ceive one. 
Following the decision in Becerra, courts must sort informed consent dis-
closures that act as regulations of conduct and have an incidental burden on 
speech from disclosures that regulate speech as speech.  Regulations of profes-
sional conduct should receive rational basis review, while regulations of speech 
as speech should receive strict scrutiny.  The point at which an informed con-
sent disclosure regulates speech as speech rather than professional conduct is 
not always clear.  Informed consent statutes that extend well beyond traditional 
informed consent disclosures – like the sonogram display and explanation re-
quirements in Stuart – indicate that the state seeks to regulate speech as speech.  
Further, when a State compels ideological disclosures, the object of the State 
is to regulate speech as speech because it substantially seeks dissemination of 
its ideological view.  A disclosure is ideological when it makes a statement on 
 
 250. Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 253. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
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a controversial subject but provides minimal information to aid the patient in 
her decision to receive an abortion – like the mandated disclosure in Rounds. 
Under the analysis for professional speech and conduct explained in 
Becerra, the Missouri statute should be subject to strict scrutiny because the 
State’s objective is to regulate speech as speech and compel dissemination of 
the State’s ideological view that life begins at conception – and abortion is, 
therefore, morally wrong.  Further, the Missouri General Assembly could not 
insulate the statute by providing statutory definitions, like in Rounds,  because 
the disclosure would still only provide the patient with minimal information, 
making the disclosure ideological.  An ideological disclosure must be subject 
to strict scrutiny because the State only aims to compel speech, thereby directly 
burdening speech.  Finally, the statute would likely fail to withstand strict scru-
tiny because of strict scrutiny’s reputation as “strict in theory and fatal in 
fact”253 and because of the importance of protecting the physician’s ability to 
choose what to discuss with his or her patients. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The doctor-patient relationship is of great importance in making health 
decisions.  While the State maintains an important interest in regulation of the 
medical profession, this interest must also be balanced with physicians’ free 
speech rights so that the State does not infect the doctor-patient relationship 
with ideas and views with which the physician does not agree.  A healthy bal-
ance between physicians’ free speech rights and the State’s ability to regulate 
the medical profession has proven difficult for federal circuit courts to estab-
lish.  The difficulty was due in part to the United States Supreme Court’s cur-
sory discussion of the issue in Casey and to confusion of the doctrine of pro-
fessional speech.  However, in Becerra, the Court recently addressed profes-
sional speech and Casey’s ruling on compelled speech. 
The decision in Becerra clarified that there is no separate category for 
professional speech.254  Therefore, the Court grants full First Amendment pro-
tection of strict scrutiny to professional speech unless the speech falls into one 
of two exceptions.  The first exception is for “commercial speech” and does 
not apply to informed consent laws in the abortion context.255  The second ex-
ception consists of regulations of professional conduct that incidentally burden 
speech.256  As indicated in Casey, informed consent laws regulate professional 
 
 253. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing 
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). 
 254. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 
(2018). 
 255. Id. at 2372 (citing Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court 
of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)). 
 256. Id. at 2373. 
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conduct because the giving of information is intertwined with the medical pro-
cedure through common law tradition.257  However, some mandated disclo-
sures in informed consent laws do not fall under this exception because they 
regulate speech as speech.258  To determine what regulates speech as speech, 
courts should consider if the disclosure falls within traditional informed con-
sent disclosures or if it is an ideological disclosure.  A disclosure is ideological 
if it promotes the State’s ideological view and is not germane to providing the 
woman information to aid her decision.259  Disclosures like the one mandated 
by the Missouri informed consent statute regulate speech as speech and deserve 
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